Introduction to the Special Issue on Management Strategy and the Environment by Lyon, Thomas P.
Introduction to the Special Issue on
Management Strategy and the Environment
THOMAS P. LYON
Stephen M. Ross School of Business and
School of Natural Resources and Environment
University of Michigan
Ann Arbor, MI 48109
tplyon@umich.edu
This special issue reflects the growing importance of the natural
environment for practitioners and scholars of business management.
A general solicitation of submissions was made, and all of the papers
in this issue were part of the general journal submission process. In
accordance with the journal’s general policy, the final selection of the
papers was made by the journal’s editorial board based on the standard
refereeing process, and I was asked to provide an introduction to this
issue.
Climate change, oil dependence, clean technology, and related
challenges occupy increasing amounts of managerial time. They are also
attracting growing scholarly interest, because their dynamic nature and
their complexity raise questions that stretch the boundaries of research
in economics and strategy. Rapidly evolving preferences, regulations,
and technologies make myopic strategies extremely costly, and reward
investments in flexibility. “Green” consumers, investors, and employ-
ees create new market opportunities. Pressures from environmental
activists and regulatory threats raise the value of clever nonmarket
strategies. Investments in new technology involve strategic commit-
ments that link market and nonmarket strategies. Because management
strategy with respect to the environment combines these factors in a
variety of novel ways, it is a ripe area for research.
Management scholars have been studying corporate environ-
mental strategy for over a decade. Since the Organizations and the
Natural Environment (ONE) group first held sessions at the Academy
of Management in 1995, group membership has doubled and academic
articles have proliferated. Furthermore, there have been numerous
efforts to integrate environmental management and sustainability into
business school curricula, including the Business, Environment, Learn-
ing and Leadership (BELL) program organized by the World Resources
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Institute, the Beyond Grey Pinstripes rankings administered by the
Aspen Institute, and the joint MBA/MS programs at Yale and at
Michigan’s Erb Institute for Global Sustainable Enterprise.
Economists have been slower to take a serious research interest
in corporate environmental strategy, even though environmental and
resource economics has been a recognized field since at least the
founding of Resources for the Future in 1952. Environmental economists
have generally treated the firm as a “black box” and focused on
policy instruments to solve market failures. This traditional approach
is inadequate, however, in a world where international law is weak,
developing countries lack regulatory capacity, rent-seeking incumbents
block policy, enforcement resources are scarce, and the size of fines
is constrained by law. As a result, corporate environmental practice is
often out ahead of policy. Recent years have seen the rise of new forms of
environmental governance, including self-regulation, voluntary agree-
ments, green marketing, socially responsible investing, green supply
chains, environmental certification, and partnerships with environmen-
tal activists. These and other related phenomena are the focus of research
on management strategy and the environment. Economists, whose
discipline emphasizes rigorous modeling and econometric testing, have
much to contribute to this growing area.
The papers included in this special issue can be placed in three
groups. The first three papers deal with broad issues of management
strategy and its adaptation to pressures from the business environment,
including pressure from green consumers and investors, pressure from
environmental activists, and regulatory pressure. The next three papers
address the fact that the environmental quality of products and firms
is often a credence good, and examine two common management
strategies that emerge in response: environmental certification pro-
grams and environmental ratings systems. The last three papers treat
environmental quality as an attribute fostering vertical differentiation
between firms, and examine in detail the strategic implications of
consumer preferences that are becoming increasingly “green.”
In the first paper in this special issue, Baron presents a theoretical
model that incorporates three separate “markets” for environmental
quality: the product market, the market for social pressure, and the
capital market. In the product market, a morally managed firm provides
a “green” product that competes with the “brown” product offered
by a profit-maximizing firm. In the market for social pressure, an
activist targets one of the two firms with a demand for environmental
improvement, and a threat of market harm if the demand is rejected. In
the capital market, a citizen–investor allocates his or her wealth between
shares of the morally managed firm, shares of the profit-maximizing
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firm, social giving, and donations to the social activist. Baron solves for a
simultaneous equilibrium in all three of these markets. He finds that the
morally managed firm sets a high price and attracts green consumers. It
also attracts investment from investors for whom its shares are a good
substitute for personal charitable giving. In the model, high-quality,
well-funded activists pursue tough targets, that is, profit-maximizing
firms or morally managed firms with strong reputations. Low-quality,
poorly funded activists pursue weak targets, that is, morally managed
firms with weak reputations.
Lenox and Eesley provide an empirical complement to Baron’s
theoretical work, offering one of the first empirical analyses of the
targeting strategies of activists. They find a firm is more likely to be
targeted if it emits a large amount of pollutants and has high cash flow.
They also find that a firm is more likely to comply with an activist’s
demands if the firm is relatively clean, the activist’s threat is large, the
firm lacks cash reserves, and the activist is not affiliated with a religious
group. These results offer practical guidance to activists and the firms
they attack, as well as being of intellectual interest to academics.
Keohane, Mansur, and Voynov investigate corporate responses
to a more traditional type of threat, namely the threat of regulatory
enforcement. They examine the compliance behavior of coal-burning
electric utilities faced with enforcement of air pollution regulations
pursuant to the New Source Review statute. They find that plants
were more likely to be targeted for enforcement lawsuits if they were
large and had high levels of emissions. They also find that prior to
the filing of enforcement lawsuits, plants that were more likely to be
sued reduced their emissions more than did other plants. In fact, on the
eve of the lawsuits, emissions at plants with a one standard deviation
greater probability of being sued fell approximately 10%. In addition,
the plants named in lawsuits reduced emissions by approximately 30%.
The authors interpret these results as showing that plants voluntarily
reduced their emissions in an attempt to avert regulatory enforcement
actions.
Our second set of papers grapples with the fact that the envi-
ronmental performance of a product or a firm is often very difficult
to ascertain. In response, environmental certification programs (eco-
labels) and ratings schemes are emerging to reduce uncertainty about
products’ and firms’ environmental attributes. For example, consumers
who wish to purchase wood products that do not harm old-growth
forests can turn to labels from the Forest Stewardship Council (FSC)
or the Sustainable Forestry Initiative (SFI), along with those from a
number of lesser-known certification programs. Investors who want
their money to support environmentally responsible firms often turn to
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the ratings published by KLD Research and Analytics. And companies
trying to select environmentally friendly suppliers often seek firms with
ISO 14001 certification.
Bottega and De Freitas develop a theoretical model to study
the performance of environmental certification by either a nonprofit
nongovernmental organization (NGO) or a for-profit private certifier,
and to compare it against the performance of a minimum quality
standard (MQS) imposed by a regulator. Either type of certification
organization can invest in persuasive advertising in support of its
standard, which increases the value consumers obtain from certification.
The underlying model involves vertical product differentiation by a
monopolist, who can offer at most two product variants. With an MQS,
the firm offers a single variant, at the quality required by the regulator.
With a certification scheme, the firm offers two variants, one at the
lowest quality level and one at the level set by the certifier. There is no
general welfare ranking between NGO and for-profit certifiers, although
the NGO always sets a higher standard. However, the authors show that
certification and an MQS are substitutes, in the sense that the regulator
sets a weaker standard in the presence of a certification body.
Chatterji, Levine, and Toffel study the social responsibility rat-
ings most widely used by investors, those produced by Kinder,
Lydenberg, Domini Research and Analytics (KLD). The authors ex-
amine whether the KLD ratings provide valid summaries of publicly
available quantitative measures of past environmental performance.
They also assess whether current KLD ratings help to predict future
performance. They find that the KLD measures of environmental
“concerns” do a reasonably good job of summarizing past performance,
and provide a modest amount of predictive power regarding future
performance. The KLD measures of environmental “strengths,” how-
ever, do not accurately predict future pollution levels or compliance
violations.
Delmas and Montiel study the use of certification schemes within
supply chains, by firms who wish to purchase inputs from environmen-
tally responsible suppliers. In particular, they study an incident from
the late 1990s, when Detroit’s Big Three automakers demanded that all
of their suppliers obtain certification by 2003 for compliance with the
ISO 14001 standard for environmental management. Nevertheless, by
July 2003, only 24% of North American suppliers to the Big Three had
become certified. Delmas and Montiel study the drivers of suppliers’
certification decisions, considering both information-based motives
and transaction cost motives. They find that suppliers with highly
specialized assets, as well as younger suppliers, larger suppliers, and
those reporting to the Toxic Release Inventory, were more likely to
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respond to their customers’ pressures to adopt the certified management
standard ISO 14001. These results provide support for both information
and transaction cost rationales for certification.
Our third set of papers focuses on competition between firms
whose products are differentiated on the basis of environmental at-
tributes. Like the papers by Baron, and by Bottega and De Freitas,
the authors represented in this group of papers discuss environmental
competition as a form of vertical product differentiation—all consumers
agree that green products are more desirable, but they differ in their
willingness to pay for green attributes. This set of papers investigates
the empirical magnitude of consumers’ willingness to pay, the strategic
implications of the greening of consumer tastes over time, and the
strategic complications that arise when competing firms offer both green
and brown versions of a product.
Casadesus-Masanell, Crooke, Reinhardt, and Vasishth estimate
customers’ willingness to pay for green product attributes, making use
of exceptionally detailed data from Patagonia, a firm with a reputation
for environmental sensitivity. They study the firm’s substitution of
organic cotton for regular cotton across its product line in 1996. The
authors find a very substantial willingness to pay for organic cotton,
even though it provided no direct benefits to the buyer. They also pro-
vide interesting insights into the process by which Patagonia decided
to make the switch to organic cotton.
Garcia-Gallego and Georgantzis study a model of vertical product
differentiation, focusing on what happens as consumer preferences
shift toward more environmentally friendly products. They identify
important links between market structure and the distribution of
consumer preferences. For example, as upscale consumer preferences
become greener, firms may respond by “greening” their products and
raising prices accordingly, thereby causing some consumers to shift
their purchases to brown firms charging lower prices. Alternatively, a
greening of preferences at the downscale end of the market may cause
firms to make their products less green, in order to bring downscale
consumers into the more profitable green market. The authors show
that there can be very subtle welfare effects resulting from increased
corporate greening, and that such greening does not necessarily create
welfare gains.
Toolsema extends the literature on switching costs to the case
of a vertically differentiated duopoly, each member of which sells two
products of exogenously determined quality. An example is competition
between two providers of electricity, each of whom sells both “green”
and “brown” power. The key finding is that higher intrafirm switch-
ing costs can induce more competitive interfirm behavior. The basic
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intuition is that intrafirm switching costs allow price discrimination
and increase profits, hence increasing the incentives of each firm to
undercut the other and try to capture its customers. An important policy
implication is that policy makers should focus on reducing interfirm
switching costs rather than intrafirm switching costs.
